Interactions and Outcomes

Interactions and Outcomes

Telcoin Governance Improvement Process (TGIP)

The process used by the Miner Assembly to alter any aspect of the Telcoin Platform governance system.

Overview

The Telcoin Governance Improvement Proposal process (TGIP) is the constitutional-choice process by which the Miner Assembly, including all four Miner groups as one collective unit (Stakers, Developers, Liquidity Miners, Validators), proposes, ratifies, and implements changes and upgrades to the Telcoin Governance System. Each Miner Group must simultaneously or sequentially approve of the same TGIP proposal in order for it to be ratified and implemented. All aspects of the Telcoin Governance System may be altered using the TGIP process.

Framework used

Using the IAD framework, we provide a set of inputs that are processed by actors into outcomes that are evaluated, with feedback effects.

  • Context: An overview of the factors that encompass all aspects of the social, cultural, institutional, and the material environment that sets the context within which the TRIP process takes place.
    • The attributes of the good
    • The attributes of the community
    • The rules-in-use
  • Interactions and Outcomes: The interactions that take place by and between actors in the TGIP process and the possible resulting outcomes.
    • Table: Participants, positions, activities, outcomes, and infrastructure involved in TGIP processes.
    • TGIP Process: Depicts the sequence of events that must be undertaken by which actors in order to submit, affirm and implement a TGIP proposal.
    • Outcomes and Feedback: The possible outcomes and resulting feedback effects of a TGIP.
    • Evaluative Criteria: Criteria that may be used by miners or external observers to determine which aspects of the observed outcomes are deemed satisfactory and which aspects are in need of improvement.

    • Contextual Factors

  • Attributes of the System: Telcoin Platform and Governance System Infrastructure
    • Overview: The Telcoin Platform is a blockchain based resource system (”platform”) that generates a flow of subtractive TEL units and a wide diversity of other digital collective goods and services. Miners, the constituent interest groups who co-produce and harvest benefits from the Platform, use a customized technology stack of mechanisms to alter the governance system itself, select council members, participate in decision-making processes that provide for system improvements, regulate the flow of TEL units, structure and enforce operational activities related to the system, communicate, and document information. We refer to this technology stack as the governance system infrastructure.
    • Learn more:
  • Attributes of the Community: Heterogenous, global, communitarian
    • Demographic Attributes: Heterogenous and global; a wide variety of corporate actors, ranging from regular tier-one mobile network operators to small businesses, and individuals from every non-sanctioned country in the world can select and participate as Miners.
    • Shared Values: The Telcoin Association Constitution outlines a set of shared values that serve as guidelines for the community to determine what should and should not be considered legitimate actions in governance processes.
  • Rules-in-use: TGIP rules

    • Interactions and Outcomes

    TGIP: Positions, Participants, Activities, Technology used, Infrastructure involved

    PositionsParticipantActivitiesOutcomesInfrastructure Involved
    TGIP Forum Proposal AuthorAny forum memberSubmits TGIP proposals to the Telcoin Forum and debates proposals with the Miner Assembly on the Telcoin discord.Either (a) eligible Miner Group TGIP authors submit the proposal to all four Miner Group Snapshots (b) the Forum author integrates feedback into a new TGIP proposal.Telcoin Forum, Discord
    TRIP Miner Group Proposal AuthorMiners with 2% of their Miner Group’s voting power and TAO Members may submit TRIP proposal to Miner Group Snapshots for voting.Individuals from all four groups submit the same TGIP proposal to each Miner Group’s snapshot and documents the proposal on http://Telcoin.org.Either (a) the Miner Assembly affirms the proposal, the outcome is documented by the author and the proposal implemented or (b) the Miner Assembly rejects the proposal, the author documents the outcome and integrates feedback.Miner Group Snapshots, governance NFTs, Telcoin.org, Discord, other governance system infrastructure
    TGIP VoterMiners with TEL staked in production processes at the time of the TGIP proposal may vote.Votes to approve or reject a proposal, debates proposals with the author on the Telcoin discord, provides rationale and constructive feedback after rejecting a proposal.Either (a) the Miner Assembly affirms the proposal, the outcome is documented by the author and the proposal implemented or (b) the Miner Assembly rejects the proposal.Miner Group Snapshots, Telcoin.org, Discord, other governance system infrastructure
    Implementation UnitThe TAO, other third parties as specified in the proposal.Implements, documents, and shares updates related to the proposal.Either (a) the proposal passes, is documented, implemented accordingly (b) is it is rejected and the outcome documented.Telcoin Documentation, Forum, Discord, other systems as specified in the proposal.

    TGIP Process

  • Forum Proposal: A Telcoin forum member submits a TGIP to the Telcoin Forum, using the TGIP template to propose an improvement to the Telcoin Governance System.
  • Miner Assembly Proposals: Miners with 2% of their Miner Group’s voting power or Telcoin Association Operations UAB (TAO) members submit the same, properly codified TGIP proposal to each of the Miner Group snapshots.
    • Requirements:
      • The proposal authors must properly codify the proposal in chronological order e.g. the first proposal is [TGIP1].
      • The proposal authors must include all details as outlined in the TGIP proposal template identically.
  • Miner Assembly Vote: Within 168 hours of submission to their respective snapshot, all miner groups must approve of the TGIP proposal with an approval rate of 80% and a quorum requirement that 20% of the total voting power in reach group must participate in all Miner Group votes.
    • Approval Rate: 80%
    • Quorum: 20%
    • Duration: 7 days or 168 hours
  • Implementation: The proposal authors from each Miner Group work with the TAO and/or other individuals and corporations as cited in the proposal, to implement the proposal.
  • Documentation: The Proposal Authors from each Miner Group work with the TAO or another firm or individual responsible for updating Telcoin.org to properly document the proposal on Telcoin.org TGIP documents.
  • Communication: The TAO and each of the proposal authors post the results of the proposal to the Telcoin Discord along with ongoing updates related to implementation.
  • TGIP Template
    • Link to Existing Policy: Please link to the rules that are subject to changed as a result of this proposal (if applicable).
    • Abstract: Please share a brief summary 2-3 of the proposed changes.
    • Specification: Please give a complete description of the changes that will be made.
    • Rationale: Please provide a rationale for the changes.
    • Implementation: Please provide details related to who will take what steps to implement the changes.

    • Outcomes and Feedback

  • Proposal Affirmed: If the proposal is affirmed through the TGIP process, the TGIP proposal authors coordinate with the TAO and/or other individuals and corporations as cited in the proposal, to implement, communicate, and document the proposal on Telcoin.org.
  • Proposal Rejected: If the proposal is rejected by the Miner Assembly, the proposal author may work with the community to gather and integrate feedback to craft a new proposal more aligned with the community’s preferences.

    • Evaluative Criteria

  • Consistency with Shared Values: Is the proposed improvement consistent with the the Mission, Vision, Values defined in Article 4.1 (a-c) of the Telcoin Association Constitution?
    • Overview: The Telcoin Association Constitution is a living, breathing document subject to indefinite adaptation by the Miner Assembly. The mission, vision, and values, collectively (’Mission’) found in Article 4.1(a, b, c) serves as a moral basis used by Miners to interpret and determine what actions and outcomes are acceptable in governance processes.
  • Feasibility: Technical, Economic, Financial, Legal, Political
    • Technical Feasibility: Can it be done? Is the potential course of action within the real of possibilities given existing knowledge and technical capabilities?
    • Economic Feasibility: Is it worth doing? Will the expected benefits to be derived from any course of action exceed the expected costs including the cost of other opportunities foregone? If this criterion can not be met, a course of action will leave people worse off than better off.
    • Financial Feasibility: Can sufficient revenues be generated with reference to a proposed course of action to cover expenditures?
    • Legal Feasibility: Is a proposed program of action lawful? Is the proposed program within the legal competence of an entrepreneur to undertake on his own authority?
    • Political Feasibility: Can the appropriate decisions be sustained?
  • Participation: Measured by quorum and approval rates, how many miners from each Miner Group are actively participating in TGIP voting processes?
    • Definition and Importance
      • Definition: Measured by the number of actors and their level of involvement in associated processes.
      • Importance: Participation tends to increase legitimacy; co-production can be especially effective form of participation.
    • Indicators: Quorum and Approval Rate
  • Legitimacy: Do miners view the deliberation process undertaken by their Miner Group related to a particular TGIP as legitimate?
    • Definition and Importance
      • Definition: Legitimacy as seen by participants in decision processes.
      • Importance: Lack of legitimacy as seen by participants may lead to conflict between actors and reduce participation rates.
  • Accountability: Are the Council Members accountable to their constituent Miner Groups concerning the policies and rules they choose and the preferences of their constituency?
    • Definition and Importance
      • Definition: When evaluating collective-choice or constitutional-choice levels, one can ask whether officials are accountable to citizens concerning the policies and rules chosen.
      • Importance: Without accountability, actors can engage in the various opportunistic, strategic behaviors. Achieving accountability requires that information about the preferences of citizens be available to decision makers.
    •