Interactions and Outcomes

Interactions and Outcomes

Telcoin Representative Improvement Proposal Process (TRIP)

The process used by Miner Groups to alter their Council Members’ special duties.

Overview

The following section provides a descriptive analysis of the Telcoin governance system in relation to the Telcoin Representative Improvement Process (TRIP). The TRIP is the constitutional-choice process by which individual Miner Groups (Stakers, Developers, Liquidity Miners, Validators) may alter their representatives’ positions, titles, special duties, selection criteria, nomination applications and evaluative criteria.

Framework used

Using the IAD framework, we provide a set of inputs that are processed by actors into outcomes that are evaluated, with feedback effects.

  • Context: An overview of the factors that encompass all aspects of the social, cultural, institutional, and the material environment that sets the context within which the TRIP process takes place.
    • The attributes of the good
    • The attributes of the community
    • The rules-in-use
  • Interactions and Outcomes: The interactions that take place by and between actors in the TRIP process and the possible resulting outcomes.
    • Table: Participants, positions, activities, outcomes and infrastructure involved in TRIP processes.
    • TRIP Process: Depicts the sequence of events that must be undertaken by which actors in order to submit, affirm and implement a TRIP proposal.
    • Outcomes and Feedback: The possible outcomes and resulting feedback effects of a TRIP.
    • Evaluative Criteria: Criteria that may be used by miners or external observers to determine which aspects of the observed outcomes are deemed satisfactory and which aspects are in need of improvement.

    • Contextual Factors

  • Attributes of the System: Telcoin Platform and Governance System Infrastructure
    • Overview: The Telcoin Platform is a blockchain based resource system (”platform”) that generates a flow of subtractive TEL units and a wide diversity of other digital collective goods and services. Miners, the constituent interest groups who co-produce and harvest benefits from the Platform, use a customized technology stack of mechanisms to alter the governance system itself, select council members, participate in decision-making processes that provide for system improvements, regulate the flow of TEL units, structure and enforce operational activities related to the system, communicate, and document information. We refer to this technology stack as the governance system infrastructure.
  • Attributes of the Community: Heterogenous, global, communitarian
    • Demographic Attributes: Heterogenous and global; a wide variety of corporate actors, ranging from regular tier-one mobile network operators to small businesses, and individuals from every non-sanctioned country in the world can select and participate as Miners.
    • Shared Values: The Telcoin Association Constitution outlines a set of shared values that serve as guidelines for the community to determine what should and should not be considered legitimate actions in governance processes.
  • Rules-in-use: TRIP rules

    • Interactions and Outcomes

    TRIP: Positions, Participants, Activities, Technology used, Infrastructure involved

    PositionsParticipantActivitiesOutcomesInfrastructure Involved
    TRIP Forum Proposal AuthorAny forum memberSubmits TRIP proposals to the Telcoin Forum and debates proposals with the Miner Group on the Telcoin discord.Either (a) an eligible Miner Group TRIP author submits the proposal (b) the Forum author integrates feedback into a new TRIP proposal.Telcoin Forum, Discord
    TRIP Miner Group Proposal AuthorMiners with 2% of their Miner Group’s voting power and TAO Members may submit TRIP proposal to Miner Group Snapshots for voting.Submits TRIP proposals to their Miner Group’s snapshot and documents the proposal on http://Telcoin.org.Either (a) the Miner Group affirms the proposal, the outcome is documented by the author and the proposal implemented or (b) the Miner Group rejects the proposal, the author documents the outcome and integrates feedback.Miner Group Snapshots, governance NFTs, Telcoin.org, Discord, other governance system infrastructure
    TRIP VoterMiners with TEL staked in production processes at the time of the TRIP proposal may vote.Votes to approve or reject a proposal, debates proposals with the author on the Telcoin discord, provides rationale and constructive feedback after rejecting a proposal.Either (a) the Miner Group affirms the proposal, the outcome is documented by the author and the proposal implemented or (b) the Miner Group rejects the proposal.Miner Group Snapshots, Telcoin.org, Discord, other governance system infrastructure
    Implementation UnitThe TAO, other third parties as specified in the proposal.Implements, documents, and shares updates related to the proposal.Either (a) the proposal passes, is documented, implemented accordingly (b) is it is rejected and the outcome documented.Telcoin Documentation, Forum, Discord, other systems as specified in the proposal.

    TRIP Process

    The following is an example of a TRIP using Stakers as the Miner Group.

  • Forum Proposal: A Telcoin forum member submits a TRIP to the Telcoin Forum, using the TRIP template to propose changes to one of the Staker representatives on the Platform Council’s special duties.
  • Miner Group Proposal: A Staker with 2% of the total TEL staked by Stakers, submits the proposal to the Staker Snapshot for voting.
    • Requirements:
      • The proposal author must properly codify the proposal in chronological order e.g. [Staker TRIP1].
      • The proposal author must include all details as outlined in the TRIP proposal template.
  • Miner Group Vote: Stakers with a staked TEL balance at the time of the proposal vote over a 7 day period. If 80% of stakers voters approve of the proposal and 20% of all staked TEL votes within 7 days, then the proposal is passed.
    • Approval Rate: 80%
    • Quorum: 20%
    • Duration: 7 days or 168 hours
  • Implementation: The proposal author works with the Telcoin Association Operations UAB (TAO) and/or other individuals and corporations as cited in the proposal, to implement the proposal.
  • Documentation: The Proposal Authors with the TAO or another firm or individual are responsible for updating Telcoin.org to properly document the proposal on Telcoin.org TRIP documents.
  • Communication: The TAO and each of the proposal authors post the results of the proposal to the Telcoin Discord along with ongoing updates related to implementation.
  • TRIP Template
    • Miner Group: Who selects representatives into this Council Member position?
    • Miner Council: Which Council does this Council Member serve?
    • Specialization/Special Duties: What is this Council Member’s current specialization and special duties?
    • Link to Nomination Application: Insert the link to the current Nomination Application in the Telcoin.org documentation
    • Abstract: Please share a brief summary 2-3 of the proposed changes.
    • Specification: Please give a complete description of the changes that will be made.
      • Rationale: Please provide a rationale for the changes.
      • Implementation: Please provide details related to who will take what steps to implement and document the changes.

    • Outcomes and Feedback

  • Proposal Affirmed: If the proposal is affirmed through the TRIP process, the TRIP proposal author coordinates with the TAO and/or other individuals and corporations as cited in the proposal, to implement, communicate, and document the proposal on Telcoin.org.
  • Proposal Rejected: If the proposal is rejected by the Miner Group, the proposal author may work with the community to gather and integrate feedback to craft a new proposal more aligned with the community’s preferences.

    • Evaluative Criteria

  • Consistency with Shared Values: Is the proposed improvement consistent with the the Mission, Vision, Values defined in Article 4.1 (a-c) of the Telcoin Association Constitution?
    • Overview: The Telcoin Association Constitution is a living, breathing document subject to indefinite adaptation by the Miner Assembly. The mission, vision, and values, collectively (’Mission’) found in Article 4.1(a, b, c) serves as a moral basis used by Miners to interpret and determine what actions and outcomes are acceptable in governance processes.
  • Feasibility: Technical, Economic, Financial, Legal, Political
    • Technical Feasibility: Can it be done? Is the potential course of action within the real of possibilities given existing knowledge and technical capabilities?
    • Economic Feasibility: Is it worth doing? Will the expected benefits to be derived from any course of action exceed the expected costs including the cost of other opportunities foregone? If this criterion can not be met, a course of action will leave people worse off than better off.
    • Financial Feasibility: Can sufficient revenues be generated with reference to a proposed course of action to cover expenditures?
    • Legal Feasibility: Is a proposed program of action lawful? Is the proposed program within the legal competence of an entrepreneur to undertake on his own authority?
    • Political Feasibility: Can the appropriate decisions be sustained?
  • Participation: Measured by quorum and approval rates, how many miners from each Miner Group are actively participating in TRIP voting processes?
    • Definition and Importance
      • Definition: Measured by the number of actors and their level of involvement in associated processes.
      • Importance: Participation tends to increase legitimacy; co-production can be especially effective form of participation.
    • Indicators: Quorum and Approval Rate
  • Legitimacy: Do miners view the deliberation process undertaken by their Miner Group related to a particular TRIP as legitimate?
    • Definition and Importance
      • Definition: Legitimacy as seen by participants in decision processes.
      • Importance: Lack of legitimacy as seen by participants may lead to conflict between actors and reduce participation rates.
  • Accountability: Are the Council Members accountable to their constituent Miner Groups concerning the policies and rules they choose and the preferences of their constituency?
    • Definition and Importance
      • Definition: When evaluating collective-choice or constitutional-choice levels, one can ask whether officials are accountable to citizens concerning the policies and rules chosen.
      • Importance: Without accountability, actors can engage in the various opportunistic, strategic behaviors. Achieving accountability requires that information about the preferences of citizens be available to decision makers.
    • Indicators: The TAN Council and its members must be accountable to Miners concerning the rules and improvements they implement.
      • Information-sharing: The community has numerous forums and ample time within deliberation processes to share their preferences with Council members.
      • Enforcement Authority: If the TAN Council proposes to implement something the community of Miners disagrees with, Miners may submit liquid delegation proposals to replace representatives at any time.
    •